Applying Weglorz' mode s of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social we fare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination”, if and only if in Weglorz' mode there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.

フェミニズム、環境批評、ポストヒューマン、精神分析、ポストコロニアリズム...多彩なトピックから文学の可能性に飛び込もう!読むことの基礎と批評理論の現在が学べるキーワード集。.

Most mitochondrial proteins are synthesized in the cytosol as preproteins with a cleavable presequence and are delivered to the import receptors on the mitochondria by cytoplasmic import factors. The proteins are then imported to the intramitochondrial compartments by the import systems of the outer and inner membranes, TOM and TIM. Mitochondrial outer membrane proteins are synthesized without a cleavable presequence and most of them contain hydrophobic transmembrane domains, which, in conjunction with the flanking segments, function as the mitochondria import signals. (...) Some of the proteins are inserted into the outer membrane by the TOM machinery; the import signal probably arrests further translocation and is released from the translocation channel to the lipid bilayer. The other proteins are inserted into the membrane by a novel pathway independent of the TOM machinery. This article reviews recent developments in the biogenesis of mitochondrial outer membrane proteins. BioEssays 22:364–371, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Kant's philosophy of arithmetic / by Charles Parsons -- Visual geometry / by James Hopkins -- The proof-structure of Kant's transcendental deduction / by Dieter Henrich -- Imagination and perception / by P.F. Strawson -- Kant's categories and their schematism / by Lauchlan Chipman -- Transcendental arguments / by Barry Stroud -- Strawson on transcendental idealism / by H.E. Matthews -- Self-knowledge / by W.H. Walsh -- The age and size of the world / by Jonathan Bennett.

The Responsible Self was H. Richard Niebuhr's most important work in Christian ethics. In it he probes the most fundamental character of the moral life and it stands today as a landmark contribution to the field. The Library of Theological Ethics series focuses on what it means to think theologically and ethically. It presents a selection of important and otherwise unavailable texts in easily accessible form. Volumes in this series will enable sustained dialogue with predecessors though reflection on classic works (...) in the field. (shrink)

The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called “free market environmentalism”, is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely (...) to contribute to environmental changes that violate traditional conceptions of property rights. Viewed globally, the actions of some countries—primarily industrialized nations—are likely to increase environmental harms suffered by other countries—less developed nations that have not made any significant contribution to climate change. It may well be that aggregate human welfare would be maximized in a warmer, wealthier world, or that the gains from climate change will offset environmental losses. Yet such claims, even if demonstrated, would not address the normative concern that the consequences of anthropogenic global warming would infringe upon the rights of people in less-developed nations. As a consequence, this paper calls for a rethinking of FME approaches to climate change policy. (shrink)

Aischylos darf als der eigentliche Schöpfer der Tragödie als literarischer Kunstform gelten, so sehr diese im 5. vorchristlichen Jahrhundert auch an ihren kultischen Ursprung gebunden bleibt. Aischylos führt den zweiten Schauspieler ein und nutzt technische Erfindungen zur Steigerung szenischer Effekte. Außerdem ist er der große Gestalter der tetralogischen Komposition, d.h. der Verbindung dreier Tragödien und eines Satyrspiels zu einer Handlungseinhait, die es ihm ermöglicht, die Verkettung von Hybris, Ate und Dike an ganzen Geschlechtern über Generationen hin zur Darstellung zu bringen. (...) Im Mittelpunkt seines Denkens steht die notwendig schuldhafte Existenz des handelnden Menschen, für den die Erfüllung einer überpersönlichen Forderung zugleich den Verstoß gegen eine andere, ebenso gültige Norm bedeutet. Überbrückt wird diese tragische Weltsicht im Glauben an die von Zeus repräsentierte Weltordnung, die den Menschen im einzelnen zwar unbegreiflich bleibt, deren grundsätzliche Sinnhaftigkeit sich ihm jedoch im Leiden erschließt. Adäquaten Ausdruck findet dieses Denken in einer urtümlichen und gewaltigen Sprache, deren Übersetzung in der hier vorliegenden Ausgabe philologisch präzis ist und gleichzeitig das Verständnis des aischyleischen Dramas erleichtert. (shrink)

pereḳ 1. ʻOśeh fele -- pereḳ 2. Ḥidud be-divre Torah -- pereḳ 3. Ḥidud be-mile de-ʻalma -- pereḳ 4. Ḳetsat shut śikhliyot ṿe-ʻimahem shene derushim le-midrash Talmud Torah.

For two hundred years, Americans have believed that they have an obligation to improve the lot of humanity, a belief that has consistently shaped U.S. foreign policy. Yet within this consensus, there are two competing schools of thought: the "exemplarist" school (Brands' term) which holds that what America chiefly owes the world is the benign example of a well-functioning democracy, and the "vindicationist" school which argues that force must sometimes supplement a good example. In this book, H.W. Brands traces the (...) evolution of these two schools as they emerged in the thinking and writing of the most important public thinkers of the past two centuries. (shrink)

In Germany the claim is sometimes made that National Socialism incorporates the best of Plato’s political theory. In this country, too, Bertrand Russell and Mr. R. H. Crossman have emphasized, but with a different intention, the fascist elements in Plato's thought. It has to be admitted that whereas it would be merely laughable to claim that Jesus or Kant were exponents of the fascist philosophy, there is no such glaring incongruity with regard to Plato. It may be of some interest, (...) therefore, to examine anew the alleged likeness between the basic principles of fascism and the thought of Plato. No one would deny a strong likeness between some details of Plato’s. (shrink)

This popular and classic text chronicles America's roller-coaster journey through the decades since World War II. Considering both the paradoxes and the possibilities of postwar America, William H. Chafe portrays the significant cultural and political themes that have colored our country's past and present, including issues of race, class, gender, foreign policy, and economic and social reform. He examines such subjects as the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, the origins and the end of the Cold War, the culture of (...) the 1970s, the rise of the New Right, the events of September 11th and their aftermath, and various presidencies.Now thoroughly revised and updated, the seventh edition of The Unfinished Journey combines and reorganizes several chapters. The former Chapter 14, "New Rules, Old Realities," is now divided into two chapters. The new Chapter 14, "An Era of Political Malaise," covers the political history of the 1970s. It is followed by Chapter 15, "A Divided Culture, A Divided Society," which assesses the shifting cultural landscape of the 1970s and the emergence of major fissures in the social system of the nation. The final chapter contains substantial new material on the administration of George W. Bush, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the election of 2008, and the first year of Barack Obama's presidency. Brilliantly written by a prize-winning historian, The Unfinished Journey, Seventh Edition, is an essential text for all students of recent American history. (shrink)

In the October number of Philosophy x appears a very interesting article by Professor H. H. Price, entitled “Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds,” the main object of which is to formulate the grounds on which we may claim logical justification for asserting that other minds exist. No attempt is made to “prove” the existence of other minds—an effort which is regarded as a wild-goose chase. Neither does Prof. Price seek to identify the actual process by which a (...) particular mind accepts the existence of others as a fact; that, presumably, is a matter for the psychologist, and it may well turn out that the phenomena which give the conviction that other minds exist may vary from individual to individual and may often be logically unevidential. The object of the article, in short, is simply to state why it is reasonable to believe that other minds exist. (shrink)

First published in 1962, Freedom and History expresses a deep concern about freedom and the way it is imperilled by misunderstandings. Professor Lewis examines works of T.H. Green and compares Green with Locke and Rousseau.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, thinker, dramatist and controversialist of many-sided interests, is the most representative figure of the German Enlightenment. His defence of Spinoza, who had traditionally been condemned as an atheist, provoked a major controversy in philosophy, and his publication of H. S. Reimarus' radical assault on Christianity led to fundamental changes in Protestant theology. This volume presents the most comprehensive collection to date in English of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings, several of which are here translated for the first (...) time. They are edited and translated by H. B. Nisbet, who also provides an introduction that sets them in their historical and philosophical contexts. (shrink)

H. P. Owen; VII—The Evidence for Christian Theism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 123–138, https://doi.org/10.1.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 227-244 Hume on Geometry and Infinite Divisibility in the Treatise H. MARK PRESSMAN Scholars have recognized that in the Treatise "Hume seeks to find a foundation for geometry in sense-experience."1 In this essay, I examine to what extent Hume succeeds in his attempt to ground geometry visually. I argue that the geometry Hume describes in the Treatise faces a serious (...) set of problems. Geometric Lines Hume maintains that ideas "are images" (T 6) which may be called up "when I shut my eyes" (T 3). "That we may fix the meaning of a word, figure," according to Hume, "we may revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea" (T 22). As Arthur Pap notes, "'Idea' is in Hume's usage synonymous with 'mental image'." D.C.G. MacNabb also notes that "Hume thought of ideas as images, and primarily as visual images."2 When Hume argues, then, that "we have the idea of indivisible points, lines and surfaces conformable to the [geometer's] definition" (T 44), he is arguing that we have mental images of geometry's points, lines and planes. Consider geometric lines first. Geometers define a line "to be length without breadth or depth" (T 42). It is not apparent to everyone that we have mental images of such lines. According to "L'Art de penser" (T 43), published in 1662, it is impossible "to conceive a length without any breadth" (T 43). H. Mark Pressman is at the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, 1238 Social Sciences and Humanities Building, Davis CA 95616-8673 USA. email: [email protected] 228 H. Mark Pressman We can only by an abstraction "consider the one without regarding the other" (T 43). Hume, however, offers "clear proof" (T 44), in the form of two arguments, that we actually possess ideas or mental images of geometry's lines. First, we have ideas or mental images of lengths with breadth, though these are supposed never to be without breadth and thus not geometric lines. (A mental image oflength is also a mental image with length, just as "to say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended" [T 240].) Hume reduces to absurdity the view that our mental images of length are always with breadth and thus not images of geometric lines. If our length-images were always with breadth, then our mental images would be endlessly divisible in breadth, since they would always have some positive breadth (T 43). But no mental image is endlessly divisible, for the mind arrives "at an end in the division of its ideas, nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion" (T 27). We thus have an idea or image of length without (divisible) breadth conforming to the geometer's definition (T 44). Second, we can imagine or picture the termination of a geometric plane. But a geometric plane must terminate in a geometric line (T 44). (Proof: Assume L is a line with breadth which terminates plane P. Since L has breadth, L must contain at least two parts, w and y, exactly one of which actually terminates P. But whether it is w or y, L doesn't terminate P, which was the assumption.) Since we can picture the termination of a geometric plane, we can picture a geometric line, length without divisible breadth. It is one thing to have ideas or mental images of geometric lines which may be called up "when I shut my eyes" (T 3). It is another for such objects actually to exist "in nature." The conceptualist holds that though (a) geometry 's points, lines and planes are ideas, nevertheless (b) there are no such things in nature and that (c) there can't be such things in nature: [T]he objects of geometry... are mere ideas in the mind, and not only never did, but never can exist in nature. They never did exist; for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a... (shrink)

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE INTRODUCTION I KNEW when I asked Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson to write this volume on Suffering that I was giving him the most difficult ...

Mr. P. H. Ling's suggestion that the famous line θερουσιν θη χρσθ' μιλαι κακα stood at the beginning of a play of Euripides seems to me to lack anything like cogent proof. A gnomic verse of this sort—to take the characteristics of the line in the order given by Mr. Ling—may indeed begin a play, as in the fragment of the Stheneboia which he quotes; but it may also begin a speech, as Hec. 864; or come early in a speech, (...) cf. Heracl. 2; or alone in stichomythia, as Alc. 540; or late in a speech, as Med. 561; or at the end of one, as Supp. 510. In other words, there is no position which it may not have. As to its lack of ‘any particle or conjunction to connect it with what preceded or followed,’ how does Mr. Ling prove that it was not preceded by γιγνσκων τι, cf. Med. 560; or that the previous line did not end in γάρ, like Hec. 551, Supp. 361; or that this line is not the end of a longer sentence, like Alc. (shrink)

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, PRUDENCE, MODERATION AND TRADITION, by Ferenc Hörcher. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2020. vi + 210pp. Hardback: $103.50; Paperback: $35.96. ISBN: 978-1-350-06718-9. Reviewed by H.G. Callaway, Department of Philosophy, Temple University. Email: HG1Callaway (at) gmail (.) com Ferenc Hörcher is Head of the Research Institute of Politics and Government of the National University of Public Service, Hungary. His new book, A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, appears in the Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition. Hörcher (...) aims to understand, elucidate and develop political conservatism in the long Aristotelian-Stoic tradition, emphasizes the role of character formation for statesmanship and political actors, the constraints implied by specific cultural traditions and the details of factual context, and addresses the contemporary standing and revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics and the specifically political virtue of prudence or “practical wisdom.” The book comes recommended by Harvard University historian James Hankins, who, on the back cover, recommends it for readers “disturbed by the collapse of statesmanship in the contemporary world.” . (shrink)

The material contained in this book is based on lectures given by Cohen at Harvard in 1965. It consists of a presentation of logic, set theory and other material, culminating in Cohen's ingenious proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice. Since this proof is certainly one of the major developments in modern mathematics, Cohen's book is something of a necessity for every serious student of the foundations of set theory and mathematics. In addition to (...) Cohen's proof, the book also contains a chapter on Gödel's proof of the consistency of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice, and a good deal of other material of general interest.—H. P. K. (shrink)

Russell writes with wit, candor, and uncommon honesty about his Victorian childhood, his painful adolescence, and his extracurricular amorous conquests. On the credit side, it must be said that it offers a remarkable insight into the development of a remarkable man. But for the benefit of those with more than a casual interest in the philosopher named Bertrand Russell, it should be mentioned that this book suffers from chronic intellectual malnutrition. Not that there isn't a lot of name-dropping and folksy (...) correspondence between the intellectual giants of the early twentieth century. There is a perfectly mad letter from Georg Cantor, who refers to Kant as "this abominable mummy"; and a perfectly charming one from Norbert Weiner's father, who, by way of introduction, states that his son has studied philosophy under "professors Royce, Perry, Palmer, Munsterberg, Schmidt, Holt, etc." In a delicious jest, Russell adds as a footnote, "Nevertheless he turned out well." There is, however, nothing substantial about philosophy in this book. At its close, Russell had completed Principia. He had returned to Cambridge already a most important figure in philosophy and mathematics. But there is no real discussion of the ideas which led up to and leavened this period in Russell's life. There is instead the dreary story of Whitehead's financial troubles. One hopes that a proper sense of the importance of things will be restored in future volumes of Russell's autobiography.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Plamenatz here attempts to revive political philosophy through an examination of the great modern thinkers. In the introduction, he meets objections to political philosophy. His defense rests on the claim that there are fundamental and enduring problems common to political philosophy and social science, and that philosophers often discuss them more profoundly and succinctly than social scientists. He has difficulty meeting the charge that political philosophy is unscientific. Since the question of the nature, legitimacy and purpose of political philosophy is (...) thematic in every major writer Plamenatz examines, one expects to find it stressed, yet it is noticed only cursorily, perhaps because the author agrees with the critics that political philosophers "were under illusions about their theories." Volume I contains chapters on Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Burke and Rousseau; Volume II on Bentham, early socialism, Hegel and Marxism.—H. C. (shrink)

This book consists of four major papers written by Peter Achinstein, Peter Geach, Wesley Salmon, and J. L. Mackie. Each of the papers has two commentaries. Achinstein’s paper is commented on by Mary Hesse and R. Harré; Geach’s paper, by Peter Winch and Grete Henry; Salmon’s paper, by D. H. Mellor and L. Jonathan Cohen; Mackie’s paper, by Renford Bambrough and Martin Hollis. Each author of the original paper then replies to his two commentators. All four papers are concerned with (...) some aspect of the concept of explanation. Achinstein’s and Salmon’s papers are extensions and justifications of their previous work. For example, Salmon has argued against Hempel’s account of scientific explanation and has maintained that certain scientific explanations are not arguments of any kind, and that consequently they need not embody the high probabilities that would be required to provide reasonable ground for expectation of the event to be explained. He argues instead that a statistical explanation of a particular event "consists of an assemblage of factors relevant to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event to be explained, along with the associated probability values". He indicates in the present volume that he does not wish to create the impression "that ability to transmit a mark is any mysterious kind of necessary connection or ‘power’ of the sort Hume criticized in Locke". There is little likelihood that Salmon would be misconstrued in this way. Also there is recent literature to the effect that Locke was clearer on the issues of causality than Hume and that there is nothing "mysterious" in Locke’s notion of powerful particulars. Why are they any more mysterious than the passive particulars preferred by Humeans? (shrink)

This volume is a collection of papers from the Third Consultation on Hermeneutics at Drew University. The goal of this conference was, in Hopper's words, to "question what kind of language, or thinking, is appropriate to a fundamental ontology, to a language that does not commit objectification, or reification, upon its subject matter in the very mode of its utterance." The first essay in the volume was not read at the conference, but is reprinted from a 1961 Harper's magazine, namely, (...) Norman O. Brown's "Apocalypse: the Place of Mystery in the Life of the Mind." It is unfortunate that Brown is given the place of honor in this collection, since his essay is somewhat offensive and irresponsible. Consider, for example: "Truth is what any fool can see. This is what is meant by so-called scientific method. So-called science is that attempt to democratize knowledge—the attempt to substitute method for insight, mediocrity for genius, by getting a standard operating procedure," or "Vacancy is not the worst condition of mind." Of the remaining papers in this book, the high-points are Kenneth Burke's "Theory of Terminology," a reader's key to his many fine writings on figurative language, Beda Allemann's "Metaphor and Antimetaphor," an interesting analysis of Kafka's prose style, and Owen Barfield's "Imagination and Inspiration," an essay on the difficulties of talking about spiritual experiences in understandable language. In fact, Barfield levels the most relevant criticism at this symposium when he cautions that "very different considerations apply to the exercise of the imagination on the one hand, and, on the other, any attempt to investigate its nature."—E. H. W. (shrink)

This book is a contribution to both the study of the logical and philosophical foundations of physics, and the investigation of applied formal axiomatic systems. Basri uses the techniques of logic and set theory in order to construct a rigorous physical theory whose theorems turn out to be those of the general theory of relativity or else arbitrarily close approximations thereof. Whether Basri's approach turns out to be fruitful for the analysis of foundational problems in physics remains to be seen, (...) but he has clearly rendered an important service in providing at least one rigorously unified way of talking about such things as particles, events, signals, clocks, rigid measuring instruments, etc. A novel feature of the book is that the basis of Basri's system is rather phenomenalistic: he uses primitives like "the class of unbiased human observers" and "the class of simultaneous sensations of observer H." The obvious philosophical problems about perception and the external world which are consequent upon this sort of approach are not treated by Basri, but he is certainly not to be faulted on this account. There are, however, a number of errors and imprecisions in the underlying logistic system, some of which are more serious than others. But in general, this book deserves to be read and its thesis considered by all students interested in serious and responsible efforts in the philosophy of physics.—H. P. K. (shrink)

An attempt to reinterpret American literature "as a kind of imaginative and experimental projection" of the "American Dream"--the ideal of perfect freedom and democracy. The author's critical and methodological principles, unfortunately, are never quite made clear.--L. H.

A small but comprehensive textbook on Boolean algebra, sentential logic, and lattice theory; this book will be of interest to students of logic and foundational studies in mathematics, particularly with respect to algebraic representations of propositional logic and elementary metamathematics of algebra. The book contains a self-dual set of postulates for Boolean algebras, with proofs of its completeness and independence. The book is written on an elementary to intermediate level, contains numerous exercises, a short index, and an even shorter bibliography.—H. (...) P. K. (shrink)

This encomium traces the fluctuations in Russell's theoretical position. These fluctuations spring from his attempt to retrieve a coherent morality from the logical doctrine that propositions asserting value are neither true nor false. The author carefully documents Russell's admissions that his own morality as a whole can claim no ground in reason or nature, and implicitly demonstrates that this state of affairs is a reasonable consequence of a fundamental belief in the unimpeachability of the fact-value distinction.--H. C.

Oehler here concerns himself with "the fundamental question, in which acts and forms did Platonic and Aristotelian thought attain certainty of itself and of the world?" The problem of consciousness is thus considered in the light of certainty. The inquiry centers on the manner in which the soul performs or executes judgments, the main texts being the Sophist and Metaphysics X. The "simple" and the "composite" is developed as the chief concrete problem. While the relation of the simple to certainty (...) is clear, its relation to self-consciousness remains dark.—H. C. (shrink)

Spanish readers are fortunate in having a publishing house which is committed to reproduce in Spanish the complete works of Georg Lukács. The complete edition will consist of twenty-four, or more, volumes, of which ten are already in print, covering mainly Lukács works on esthetics and literary criticism. The Hegel volume was originally published in German in 1948. The main draft was written as early as the fall of 1938, but the outbreak of World War II delayed publication. Lukács at (...) that time was in the Soviet Union where, following Stalin's lead, Hegel was characterized as an apologist for the Prussian feudal opposition to the French revolution. Considering the winning of the war as more important than provoking a controversy over Hegel, Lukács put his manuscript aside for the duration. In The Young Hegel, Lukács settles his account with Hegel, much as Marx and Engels in The German Ideology--with one significant difference. The objective of Marx and Engels was the abolition of Hegelianism. Their polemic, therefore, was directed against Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. Lukács, on the other hand, sought the restoration of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism, and, while accepting the Marxian critique of Hegelianism, directed his attack against the detractors of Hegel--against the Stalin line within Marxism and against those like Dilthey and Kierkegaard outside of Marxism who transformed Hegel into an "irrationalist." Lukács is consequently much more positive in his treatment of Hegel than Marx and Engels. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács emphasized the necessity of understanding Hegel in order to properly understand Marx. In The Young Hegel, the emphasis is on the dialectical opposite--Hegel is understood through the eyes of Marx, through the critique of Marx and through a Marxian interpretation by Lukács. Lukács' unique contribution in the present work is the detailed study of the close union of philosophy and economics in the genesis of Hegel's thought. Indeed, the original subtitle of the German edition reads: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie. The Spanish edition has a two-and-a-half page preface, written specially for it by Lukács in 1963, in which he states his conviction of the importance in the thought of Hegel and other great philosophers of concern with economic problems, both from the standpoint of economic theory and actual economic conditions. An English edition has been promised by Merlin Press in London, but no date of publication has yet been announced.--H. B. (shrink)

The religious controversies of the 17th century are of central importance to any attempt to appraise the role of Christianity in the genesis of "modern secular society." In the 18th century there was a clear understanding that modern philosophy was hostile to religion, as the French Revolution proclaimed. The reappraisal of this relation began in Hegel's Phänomenologie, and became explicit with Max Weber: secularism is the consequence of Christianity. The adjudication of this issue demands an evaluation of the interpretations of (...) the Bible and of Christian morality made by such men as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle. According to the Enlightenment, they speak as believers only in order to interpret Christianity in such a way as to make it tolerate the new philosophy. Rex would correct this view of Bayle's intention; he would show that Protestantism, and in Bayle's case, Calvinism, is the source or a source of the belief in the sovereignty of reason. One may doubt whether Rex has proved that the Enlightenment misunderstood Bayle's intentions. Nevertheless, this study, the first part of which is devoted to the Pensées diverses sur la comète, the second to the Commentaire philosophique, is a very helpful guide to an extensive literature. And in his very attempt to prove his thesis Rex frequently brings to light aspects of Bayle's rhetoric that must be noticed in order to understand his writings.—H. C. (shrink)

This book is a rare piece of writing in any language. Its first merit is that it puts in 360-odd pages a concise and highly readable history of economic thought from Ricardo and Adam Smith to modern times as seen through the critical spectacles of classical Marxist political economy. Its second merit is that it does not dismiss capitalist economics as mere apologetics or mystification, but--in the genuine spirit of Marx's principles of criticism--it also seeks out the positive aspects of (...) methodology and understanding which can help clarify the workings and malfunctions of late twentieth century capitalism. Nor does the author bow before any mystic infallibility of current Soviet economic theory. Among the most interesting treatments are those of the theories of Böhm-Bawerk, Schumpeter, Marshall, Veblen, Hobson, Hilferding, Kalecki, Keynes, Harrod-Domar, Kaldor, Sraffa, Galbraith, Myrdal, Strachey, and Bettelheim. Aguilar is a professor of economics at the University of Mexico and displays impressive scholarship and perception in his chosen field. His call is for Latin American intellectuals to free themselves from the restrictions of the economic theories of capitalist economics and to dedicate themselves to the development of the theoretical foundations necessary for the liberation of Latin America not only from economic domination, but also from the cultural, social, and political tutelage of their economic masters. Marx's model of capitalism and Lenin's model of imperialism have not lost their power in Latin America as grounds for explaining the continued economic, cultural, social, and political backwardness of this huge area. The present work demonstrates the intellectual sweep of this power. The book is well-footnoted, but, deplorably, lacks an index.--H. B. (shrink)

This reflective work wants to disclose the intention moving early Greek philosophy, which, as the title hints, sought to lay bare the ground for "the way things are." The failure of the physiologoi to discover in nature an intelligible Gegenwart in which nature as a whole could appear led Heraclitus and Parmenides, to whom most of the book is devoted, to examine the ground of logos, and therewith, of truth and opinion. Commensurate with his intention to emphasize those elements of (...) early Greek philosophy common to its greatest representatives, Boeder concludes by pursuing his theme into Zeno's development of dialectic.--H. C. (shrink)